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Abstract: Electricity is a vital factor underlying modern living standards, but there are many
developing countries with low levels of electricity access and use. We seek to systematically
identify the crucial elements underlying transitions toward greater electrification in developing
countries. We use a cross-sectional regression approach with national-level data up to 2012 for
135 low- and middle-income countries. The paper finds that the effectiveness of governments is the
most important governance attribute for encouraging the transition to increased electrification in
developing countries, on average. The results add to the growing evidence on the importance of
governance for development outcomes. Donors seeking to make more successful contributions to
electrification may wish to target countries with more effective governments.
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1. Introduction
Electricity is the highest-quality energy form and a vital facilitator of modern living standards
and production processes. Providing access to modern energy services, such as electricity, is a key
objective of developing countries (low- and middle-income countries based on World Bank income
categories in 2016) [1], but there is considerable variation across countries. In 2012, in the average
developing country, 68% of the population had residential access to electricity, but some countries had
much lower coverage. Less than a quarter of the population had access to electricity in 2012 in many
Sub-Saharan African countries and some Pacific Island countries [2]. In 2014, over one billion people,
about three times the population of the United States, did not have access to electricity [3]. There is,
however, relatively little systematic evidence on the reasons why some developing countries have
progressed further in electricity transitions than others. This paper investigates a range of quantified
measures of transition toward greater electrification in developing countries.
The importance of transitions toward greater electrification in developing countries is evident
when considering a range of economic, social, health, and environmental impacts. Electricity is
crucial from an economic perspective, as it is an important factor of production [4]. Economic impacts
of electrification are also evident at the household level, with increased labor supply following
electrification in some cases [5,6]. Children also benefit from electricity as there is more time available
for education when electricity reduces the need to collect fuelwood [7]. In addition, electricity use can
reduce a leading disease risk factor, household air pollution from solid fuel use [8]. Further, electricity
can contribute to the transition toward low-carbon energy systems if low-carbon energy sources are
used in electricity generation and electricity replaces use of solid fuels such as charcoal.
Institutions are important for economic growth [9,10] although there is less literature on the role
of governance for broader development outcomes [11]. There are some studies that do assess the role
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of governance for development outcomes. Rajkumar and Swaroop [12] find that public spending
improves health and education outcomes when governance is good, and Halleröd et al. [13] find
that quality of governance affects basic human needs. Edwards [14] notes that poor government
effectiveness can lead to education and health system failure. If governance also has an impact on
electricity sector outcomes, there can be flow-on impacts to many development outcomes that relate to
electricity availability.
There are a number of different governance attributes [15,16] that could be important for electricity
transitions. For instance, governments that are effective in general are also more likely to be effective in
electricity provision. Onyeji et al. [17] find that government effectiveness seems to explain more of the
variation in electricity in Sub-Saharan African countries compared to other countries, while Magnani
and Vaona [18] find that efficiency in revenue mobilization is positively related to access to electricity.
The degree of corruption could be another governance attribute impacting on electricity outcomes.
Dal Bó and Rossi [19] find that more corruption in a country is associated with lower efficiency
in electric utility firms in a sample of Latin American countries. Estache et al. [20] also find that
corruption has negative impacts for the electricity sector. Pless and Fell [21] identify a specific way
that corruption can adversely affect electricity sectors, with increases in firm bribes for electricity
connections associated with lower aggregate electricity supply reliability.
Effective governments could be important for electricity sectors for many reasons.
Electricity transmission is an example of a natural monopoly. Also, secure supply of electricity
can be regarded as possessing public good characteristics [22]. Public sector involvement in electrification
is crucial when there are major obstacles for the private sector. Private sector involvement may be
particularly limited in rural areas, due to reasons such as the small size of the market, population
dispersion, and weak paying capacity of consumers [23]. In addition, the large scale and complexity
of electrification programs requires long-term commitment, prioritization, and planning, along with
the large up-front investments [24]. The major role of governments in electrification is emphasized by
Bhattacharyya [25] (p. 265): ‘it is not sufficient to have the legal framework or organizational arrangement
for a successful electrification programme. It requires a strong government commitment and financial
support, a strong strategy and a systematic plan to bring success’. Strong government commitment is
a common theme for developing countries achieving success in electrification, such as South Africa [23],
Vietnam [26], and Indonesia [27]. In contrast to these successful historical outcomes, weak governance is
associated with weak outcomes for electrification in some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa [23].
The degree of democracy in a country could be important for electrification. Democracies produce
higher levels of public services than autocratic regimes [28] in some cases, including increased
electrification in South Africa [29]. For a sample of African countries, Ahlborg et al. [30] find that
democracy has a positive impact on household electricity consumption per capita. Trotter [31] presents
evidence that there is a positive association between democracy and rural electrification in Sub-Saharan
Africa. For small island developing states, Boräng et al. [32] find that democracy supports electricity
consumption when the level of corruption is low. Others have suggested that more authoritarian
governments could be beneficial: Wolfram et al. [33], for example, note the conjecture that electricity
access in China is greater than India partly because of the strong authoritarian government in China.
A range of government reforms and policies can potentially affect electricity transitions.
Reform related specifically to the electricity and energy sectors could potentially have major impacts
on the electricity sector, although experiences are mixed. Electricity and energy reform has led to
modest efficiency gains in the context of incomplete and uneven reform processes in developing
countries [34–36]. Reform outside the energy sector could also be important. Nepal and Jamasb [37]
note that power sector reform is interdependent with reforms in other sectors. The mixed results of
electricity reforms and the potential impact of reform outside the electricity sector imply that general
government effectiveness could be influential for electricity outcomes.
This paper contributes by comprehensively assessing the impact of government effectiveness
on a range of quantified electricity measures including electricity capacity, access, consumption,
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transmission and distribution losses, and quality of supply. We focus on deep determinants rather than
sector-specific government policies, controlling for many important variables, to assess the impact
of enduring factors that contribute to electricity transitions. We use a sample of up to 135 low- and
middle-income countries. This is the first paper to document the role of government effectiveness
for electricity transitions with such a broad coverage of developing countries, electricity dimensions,
and deep determinants. Robustness tests include an instrumental variable approach and a model that
uses changes in the dependent variable, to address potential endogeneity. The next section considers
variation in electricity use for developing countries, followed by the more systematic approach.
2. Initial Evidence
Figure 1 shows the countries with final electricity consumption per capita of less than 250 kilowatt
hours per year. These countries are predominantly in Africa. For Asia and the Pacific it is more mixed;
some countries have low consumption of electricity but most others have consumption above the
250 kilowatt hour per capita threshold in 2012. Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu, and Kiribati have electricity consumption per capita below 250 kilowatt hours in 2012.
The highlighted countries are generally low-income or lower middle-income countries, emphasizing
the importance of controlling for income when testing for the impact of government effectiveness on
electricity consumption per capita.
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Figure 1. Countries shaded in red (dark shade) if final electricity consumption per capita in 2012 was
less than 250 kilowatt hours. Data are available for 133 developing countries. The ost populous
country for hich data are unavailable is Eritrea. Sources: [2,38].
While there is a positive relationship between government effectiveness and electricity
consumption, evident in Figure 2, there is considerable variation around the line of best fit suggesting
factors other than government effectiveness are important. Some countries such as Malaysia have
relatively high electricity consumption and government effectiveness scores. In contrast, over half of
developing countries have final electricity consumption per capita of less than one megawatt hour
per year, including countries such as Chad, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. One megawatt hour
per capita equates to a value of zero for the log scale in Figure 2.
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The World Bank uses a modelling approach that incorporates regional electricity access data when
there are missing data [42].
Our key independent variable, Gc, is government effectiveness from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators [39]. The variable is based on 48 components that measure perceptions of the quality of
public service delivery, policy formulation, and policy implementation. While there is potential for
measurement error in any governance indicator, including perceptions-based measures, the Worldwide
Governance Indicators are widely relied upon [15]. Only two of the 48 components of government
effectiveness relate to electricity: coverage of the electricity grid, and how problematic electricity is
for growth of business. The government effectiveness variable is thus suitably distinct from variables
measuring electricity capacity, consumption, access, transmission and distribution losses, and quality
of supply. State effectiveness from the State Fragility Index [43] is an alternative measure. Electricity is
not an explicit component of the state effectiveness variable that is comprised of four components:
economic, social, political, and security effectiveness. Table 1 shows the range of values for government
effectiveness, and also summarizes the data for the electricity dependent variables.
Table 1. Electricity use and government effectiveness, developing countries, 2012.
Variable Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation
Electricity capacity per capita 0.003 0.38 2.51 0.45
Household electricity consumption per capita 0.005 0.38 2.11 0.39
Final electricity consumption per capita 0.01 1.14 5.19 1.15
Electricity access 0.05 0.68 1.00 0.33
Transmission and distribution losses 0.06 0.17 0.83 0.11
Electricity quality 1.18 3.66 6.03 1.28
Government effectiveness −2.23 −0.56 1.01 0.63
Notes. Electricity capacity is in kilowatts. Electricity consumption is in megawatt hours. Electricity access is
percentage of population with access to electricity divided by 100. Electricity transmission and distribution losses
are percentage of electricity output divided by 100. Electricity quality and government effectiveness are index values.
Electricity quality ranges from 1 for extremely unreliable to 7 for extremely reliable. Government effectiveness is
distributed over a standard normal.
We also examine the relative importance of government effectiveness vis-à-vis other governance
attributes. Using the Worldwide Governance Indicators [39], these other governance attributes are
regulatory quality, political stability, voice and accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption.
The governance attributes are described in Appendix A.
We control for a number of other variables in x′c, as defined and included in the subsequent
text and tables. There are a number of geographical or demographic aspects that could be important
for differences in electricity transitions across countries. For instance, there could be electricity
demand differences for heating and cooling purposes due to temperature differences between
countries. Other factors include population density and the percentage of the population in rural areas.
Electricity network extension would be more costly per person when population density is lower,
while more dispersed rural populations may be harder to reach. A measure of hydro endowments is
another control, as hydroelectricity is an important energy source in many developing countries [44].
Economic factors may contribute to electricity sector development. For instance, higher-income
countries could afford to invest in greater levels of electricity infrastructure and to have higher
consumption levels. For a component of total electricity use, Pfeiffer and Mulder [45] find that
non-hydro renewable electricity is promoted by higher per capita income. In relation to analysis of
household data from Mexico, Gertler et al. [46] suggest a nonlinear Engel curve with purchase of
energy-using assets being much more likely above income thresholds. Price for electricity consumption
may also impact on various electricity outcomes including consumption and losses in transmission
and distribution.
We also control for policy and other differences across countries. We use a binary variable with
value of one for countries in Africa and the Middle East. This binary variable controls for factors that
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are common across these countries. One common factor across countries in both Africa and the Middle
East has been the stage of power sector reforms. Nagayama [47] notes that reforms have proceeded in
Asia and South America, but have been delayed in Africa and the Middle East. We also use a power
sector reform indicator [48], with values from zero to six, to control for lagged policy reform up to
1998 more directly. This indicator is the sum of binary sub-component indicators for the following six
power sector reforms: corporatization, regulation, regulatory body, independent power producers,
restructure of state-owned utility, and privatization of generation or distribution.
There are a number of data sources for the geographic, demographic, and economic variables
included in x′c. Temperature data are from the climate dataset CRU CY v.3.22 of the Climate Research
Unit [49]. Electricity price for a business with a standardized warehouse, measured in US cents
per kilowatt-hour, is from the World Bank [50] Doing Business data. From the World Development
Indicators, the rural proportion of the population and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in
purchasing power parity terms in constant 2011 international dollars are other key independent
variables. Population density, water resources per capita, country income groups, and region are also
from the World Bank [2]. To account for the degree of democracy, we use the Polity2 variable from
Marshall et al. [51]. GDP data from 1960 are from the Clio Infra [52] database.
Endogeneity from reverse causation or omitted variables is a potential issue. For instance, electricity
availability and quality could affect the ability of governments to be effective. Omitted variables related
to technology or political differences across countries could also bias results if these factors are correlated
with both electricity and government effectiveness. We address the issue of potential endogeneity in
a number of ways, including use of lagged variables, an instrumental variable approach, and dependent
variables measuring changes rather than levels.
To reduce the risk of endogeneity from reverse causation, we use the lagged values of government
effectiveness from 1996 in one table of results. 1996 is the first year of data for government effectiveness
and is before the start of electricity transitions in many developing countries. For instance, total
electricity capacity in low- and middle-income countries was nearly three times larger in 2012 compared
to 1996. We also investigate using lagged values from 1996 for the controls that are more likely to be
endogenous: log GDP per capita and rural population percentage. The power sector reform indicator
includes reforms up to 1998. In another robustness test, GDP data from 1960 are used [52].
An instrumental variable approach is another way to address potential endogeneity. We use log
life expectancy from 1950 to 1955 from the UN [53] World Population Prospects as an instrument for
2012 government effectiveness. Countries with higher life expectancy in the past have had a more
conducive context and greater incentive for institutional development over time, allowing for higher
levels of government effectiveness to develop. Life expectancy could also relate to other variables to
a lesser extent, for instance geography, but we partly address this issue by controlling for important
geographical aspects. The considerable positive correlation between 1950 life expectancy and 2012
government effectiveness (0.5) helps make 1950 life expectancy a suitable instrument. 1950 pre-dates
much of the development of electricity systems [44], particularly in developing countries, reducing the
risk of reverse causation. The instrumental variable approach is similar to the use of settler mortality
as an instrument for current institutions [9].
We also use the model described by Equation (2) to focus on medium-term changes in the
dependent variable. This helps to reduce the risk of endogeneity, showing the impact of initial levels
of government effectiveness on subsequent electricity transitions:
∆Ejc = Gcαj + x′c βj + ε
j
c (2)
∆Ejc is the average annual percentage change for the electricity quantity variables of capacity,
final consumption, and household consumption over the period 1996–2012. ∆Ejc is the percentage
point change for the period 2000–2012 for electricity access, the percentage point change for the period
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1996–2012 for electricity transmission and distribution losses, and the change in index value from
2006–2012 for electricity quality.
There is a different set of controls for the dependent variables in Equation (2) compared to
Equation (1). In Equation (2), controls include GDP per capita growth over the period 1996–2012,
the initial level of log GDP per capita in 1996, and also the initial level of the relevant electricity variable.
If there is a negative relationship between the initial level and subsequent growth in an electricity use
variable, there has been cross-country convergence.
4. Results
Table 2 shows initial results for the impact of government effectiveness on the log of final electricity
consumption per capita without any controls. The impact of other governance attributes from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators is also shown, allowing for a comparison of the relative importance
of each governance attribute. Each of the governance attributes has positive coefficients that are
significant at the one percent level, but government effectiveness has the largest coefficient of all the
governance attributes. In addition, government effectiveness explains 33% of the variation in the
log of final electricity consumption per capita, and this is considerably above the other governance
attributes, with rule of law the next largest at 22%. Government effectiveness also explains more of
the variation in other electricity variables such as generation capacity, household consumption, access
rate of the population, transmission and distribution losses, and quality. Also, the regulatory quality
variable that focuses on private sector development only explains 17% of the variation in the log of
final electricity consumption per capita. Government effectiveness appears to be more important than
other governance attributes for electricity consumption on average.
Table 2. Results, Worldwide Governance Indicators and log of final electricity consumption per
capita, 2012.
Dependent Variable:
Log of Final Electricity Consumption Per Capita (Megawatt-Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government 1.350 ***
effectiveness (0.164)
Control of 1.030 ***
corruption (0.209)
Voice and 0.572 ***
accountability (0.145)
Political stability/ 0.496 ***
no violence (0.120)
Regulatory 0.890 ***
quality (0.180)
Rule of 1.107 ***
law (0.157)
Number of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.333 0.164 0.098 0.099 0.168 0.223
Notes. *** shows statistical significance at the 1 per cent level. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the
coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown. All variables are for 2012. The coefficient for government
effectiveness is similar when using the between estimator with panel data for 2002–2012.
The results in Table 3 show that government effectiveness has a beneficial association with
electricity sectors in developing countries, when controlling for other variables. There are positive
coefficients for government effectiveness from 1996 in explaining four of the electricity dependent
variables, with significance at the one percent level in column 3. Using state effectiveness from the State
Fragility Index instead of government effectiveness from the Worldwide Governance Indicators also
produces a corresponding significant coefficient in explaining the log of final electricity consumption
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per capita. In addition, the government effectiveness variable is still significant at the one percent level
when regulatory quality is included as a control in the regression explaining the log of final electricity
consumption per capita. A one-unit increase in government effectiveness is associated with an increase
of 52% in final electricity consumption per capita on average, all else equal, based on Table 3. Column 5
suggests that a one-unit increase in government effectiveness is associated with 5% less transmission
and distribution losses. A one-unit change in government effectiveness is equivalent to approximately
30% of the range of the values for government effectiveness in the low- and middle-income countries
in our sample. The government effectiveness index has a standard deviation of one.
There are positive coefficients for the log of GDP per capita from 1996 in Table 3, significant in
explaining the electricity variables in 2012 at the one percent level, except for electricity quality which
has significance at the ten percent level, and the non-significance for electricity losses. The positive
coefficients match expectation because countries with higher incomes have greater ability to increase
electricity sector investment and greater demand to consume electricity, all else equal. Our use of the
lagged value of log GDP per capita helps to partly address potential reverse causation from electricity
to GDP per capita.
Higher proportions of populations in rural areas are associated with lower electricity access and
use. The negative coefficient for rural population percentage in contributing to access to electricity
is significant at the one percent level. This result matches expectation due to the greater difficulty
in extending access to more dispersed populations. Having a larger rural share of the population
is also associated with lower electricity capacity per capita, final electricity consumption per capita,
and household electricity consumption per capita.
There are some significant coefficients for geographical variables in Table 3. Negative coefficients
for temperature in explaining electricity dependent variables are significant at the one percent level in
each of the first four columns. There is also some evidence that larger water resources support greater
electricity capacity, with a positive coefficient and significance at the five percent level.
Electricity price is associated with significant impacts on electricity sectors in developing countries.
Electricity price has a negative coefficient for household electricity consumption per capita, significant
at the one percent level. While the electricity prices are from a survey for commercial business
customers, it is reasonable to assume that household electricity prices across countries could be
positively correlated with business prices. The negative coefficient for electricity price in the household
electricity consumption regression is reasonable as higher electricity price would lower the quantity
demanded. There would also be greater incentive to increase the quantity supplied when price
is higher, but consumer capacity to pay high prices could be constrained in developing countries.
Also, where the electricity price is higher, electricity transmission and distribution losses tend to be
higher, as shown in column 5.
For the binary variable for countries in Africa and the Middle East, there are significant
coefficients showing adverse effects for all six electricity dependent variables. The significance of the
Africa/Middle East binary variable is not just related to common factors in Africa alone. With two
binary variables, one for countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and one for countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, there are significant coefficients for each variable (results not shown). For the
Middle East and North Africa binary variable, there are significant coefficients for three of the six
electricity regressions. One possible explanation is that the lack of electricity sector reforms in these
regions, identified by Nagayama [47], contributes in part to the significant coefficients. There are
similar results when using an indicator of reform in electricity sectors [48] instead of the binary variable
for countries in Africa and the Middle East. For example, the government effectiveness coefficient
in the final electricity consumption regression changes from 0.522 to 0.527. The indicator of reform
is not included in Table 3 as it would lower the sample size and because the paper focuses on deep
determinants of electricity transitions rather than sector-specific determinants of electricity transitions.
The key government effectiveness variable assesses government policy holistically, including power
sector reform.
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Table 4 confirms the important role of government effectiveness for electricity sectors in
developing countries, supporting the case for a causal relationship rather than just correlation.
The instrument, log life expectancy from 1950 to 1955, explains 18% of the variation in 2012 government
effectiveness for the electricity quality regression after controlling for other variables in the first stage
of the two-stage least squares process. Other changes to reduce the risk of endogeneity include using
lagged data from 1960 for log GDP per capita and rural population percentage, and dropping two
potentially endogenous variables, electricity price and democracy score, that do not have historical
data prior to the commencement of major electricity sector development. There are statistically
significant coefficients for government effectiveness in five of the six columns. The relationship
between government effectiveness and final electricity consumption per capita is particularly strong.
There is significance at the one percent level for government effectiveness in explaining the log of final
electricity consumption per capita in Table 4 and also in Table 3. The government effectiveness variable
is also significant at the one percent level in the electricity access column in Table 4, in contrast to the
lack of significance for the corresponding coefficient in Table 3. The estimates in the first four columns
of Table 4 pass the Stock-Yogo weak instrument test, with the F statistic on the excluded instrument
exceeding the critical value.
There are similarities and differences for the controls in Table 4 compared to Table 3. The coefficients
for log GDP per capita from 1960 are positive, but only column 6 has significance at the one
percent level. For rural population percentage, the coefficient magnitudes are similar, as is statistical
significance. There are again negative impacts of temperature for electricity capacity and consumption.
The coefficients for population density and water resources are mostly not significant in Table 4.
There are negative coefficients for the Africa/Middle East binary variable, but only in the electricity
access regression in column 4 is there significance at the one percent level.
Table 5 shows the impact of initial government effectiveness levels on subsequent changes in
electricity. Government effectiveness from 1996 has positive and significant coefficients for each of
the electricity variables except electricity losses or the electricity quality index, with significance at
the one percent level in both the household electricity consumption per capita and final electricity
consumption per capita regressions. For a one-unit increase in the government effectiveness index,
the per capita final consumption of electricity increases by 1.9 percentage points per annum on average.
The positive coefficients for government effectiveness in explaining subsequent changes in electricity
rather than levels are again suggestive of a causal relationship.
The signs of the coefficients for the controls in Table 5 match expectation. For the log of GDP per
capita in 1996 from Table 5, the coefficients are positive and significant, except for the non-significant
coefficients for the change in electricity losses and access to electricity. The positive coefficient for
the log of GDP per capita in explaining the change in electricity is significant at the one percent level
for both consumption variables and for electricity capacity. There are also positive and significant
coefficients for GDP per capita growth, confirming that electricity use increases as economies grow.
The magnitude of the coefficients for log of GDP per capita and the growth of GDP per capita are
similar to the findings of Burke and Csereklyei [54].
Growth in electricity use is slower in countries that already use more electricity. For example,
the log of final electricity consumption per capita in 1996 has a negative coefficient, significant at the
one percent level, in explaining the change in final electricity consumption per capita for the period
1996–2012. These convergence-style coefficients are reasonable, as there may be less incentive for
transitions toward greater electricity use when the initial levels are already higher. There could be
diminishing returns to greater electricity use after a certain point.
A relatively large fraction of the variation in the electricity variables is explained by the regressions
in each table. The R-squared values are approximately 0.8 for the regressions for electricity capacity,
consumption, and access in Table 3, while the R-squared value for the change in final electricity
consumption per capita is above 0.5 in Table 5.
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Table 3. Results, lagged government effectiveness and electricity use, 2012.
(1) Log of Electricity
Capacity Per
Capita (Kilowatts)
(2) Log of Household
Consumption of Electricity
Per Capita (Megawatt-Hours)
(3) Log of Final
Consumption of Electricity
Per Capita (Megawatt-Hours)
(4) Access to Electricity
(Percentage of Population
Divided by 100)
(5) Electricity Transmission
and Distribution Losses
(Percentage of Output
Divided by 100)
(6) Electricity
Quality Index
Government 0.308 * 0.314 ** 0.522 *** −0.006 −0.049 * 0.551 **
effectiveness 1996 (0.183) (0.142) (0.171) (0.038) (0.026) (0.249)
Log GDP 0.604 *** 0.801 *** 0.678 *** 0.157 *** −0.014 0.345 *
per capita, 1996 (0.163) (0.124) (0.166) (0.028) (0.025) (0.196)
Rural population −0.019 *** −0.012 ** −0.016 *** −0.005 *** 0.001 −0.009
(% of pop.), 1996 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
Population −0.079 0.343 0.114 0.295 * −0.064 −1.032
density (0.520) (0.347) (0.313) (0.165) (0.045) (0.964)
Temperature −0.050 *** −0.041 *** −0.053 *** −0.008 *** −0.001 −0.010
degrees Celsius (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020)
Water resources 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.004 **
per capita (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Electricity −0.017 −0.026 *** −0.014 −0.002 0.004 * 0.018
price (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
Democracy/ −0.023 −0.010 −0.021 * −0.003 0.001 −0.051 **
autocracy (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.021)
Africa/Middle −0.928 *** −0.621 *** −0.702 *** −0.243 *** 0.062 ** −0.824 **
East (0.189) (0.134) (0.140) (0.041) (0.024) (0.365)
Number of countries 100 97 100 100 73 83
R2 0.804 0.831 0.843 0.812 0.214 0.423
Notes. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown.
Electricity price is the average of 2015 and 2016 data as earlier years of data are not available. Africa/Middle East is a binary variable equal to one for countries in Africa or the Middle East,
and zero otherwise.
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Table 4. Instrumental variable results, government effectiveness and electricity use, 2012.
(1) Log of Electricity
Capacity Per
Capita (Kilowatts)
(2) Log of Household
Consumption of Electricity
Per Capita (Megawatt-Hours)
(3) Log of Final
Consumption of Electricity
Per Capita (Megawatt-Hours)
(4) Access To Electricity
(Percentage of Population
Divided by 100)
(5) Electricity Transmission and
Distribution Losses (Percentage
of Output Divided by 100)
(6) Electricity
Quality Index
Government 1.562 *** 1.949 *** 1.730 *** 0.260 *** −0.140 ** 0.686
effectiveness IV (0.417) (0.491) (0.346) (0.072) (0.065) (0.567)
Log GDP 0.337 0.426 0.474 0.071 0.069 0.826 ***
per capita, 1960 (0.324) (0.352) (0.290) (0.073) (0.059) (0.319)
Rural population −0.035 *** −0.019 −0.023 ** −0.009 *** 0.002 0.001
(% of pop.), 1960 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.016)
Population −0.780 −0.781 −0.868 0.108 −0.024 −1.694 **
density (0.771) (0.918) (0.913) (0.116) (0.067) (0.688)
Temperature -0.045 ** −0.045 *** −0.055 *** −0.004 0.003 −0.009
degrees Celsius (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.002) (0.022)
Water resources −0.001 −0.001 −0.005 −0.000 −0.001 −0.012 *
per capita (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007)
Africa/Middle −0.341 −0.089 −0.232 −0.144 *** −0.022 -0.533
East (0.236) (0.257) (0.213) (0.049) (0.036) (0.351)
Number of countries 92 87 92 92 66 73
R2 0.609 0.509 0.648 0.641 0.148 0.530
Second-stage F stat 27.98 *** 17.97 *** 32.65 *** 33.21 *** 1.32 10.70 ***
Instrument: Log life expectancy, 1950–1955
F statistic (excluded) 15.257 12.564 15.257 15.257 6.435 7.729
Partial R2 0.162 0.168 0.162 0.162 0.088 0.181
Notes. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown.
The Stock-Yogo test critical value at 5% significance level (15% maximal IV size) is 8.96.
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Table 5. Results, government effectiveness and change in electricity use, changes up to 2012.
(1) Annual Percentage
Change in Electricity
Capacity Per Capita
(1996–2012)
(2) Annual Percentage
Change in Household
Consumption of Electricity
Per Capita (1996–2012)
(3) Annual Percentage
Change in Final
Consumption of Electricity
Per Capita (1996–2012)
(4) Change in Access to
Electricity (2000–2012)
(5) Change in Electricity
Transmission and
Distribution Losses
(1996–2012)
(6) Change in
Electricity Quality
Index (2006–2012)
Government 0.011 ** 0.016 *** 0.019 *** 0.021 * −0.038 −0.020
effectiveness, 1996 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.026) (0.218)
Log GDP 0.021 *** 0.017 *** 0.021 *** 0.006 −0.023 0.489 ***
per capita, 1996 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.023) (0.144)
GDP p.c. growth 0.800 *** 0.792 *** 0.883 *** 0.115 −1.708** 17.885 ***
p.a. 1996–2012 (0.174) (0.150) (0.171) (0.278) (0.756) (4.615)
Log electricity −0.019 ***
capacity pc, 1996 (0.004)
Log household −0.020 ***
elec. cons. pc, 1996 (0.004)
Log final electricity −0.022 ***
consumption pc, 96 (0.003)
Access to -0.099 ***
electricity, 2000 (0.024)
Electricity losses −0.866 ***
(% of output, 1996) (0.108)
Electricity quality −0.438 ***
index, 2006 (0.142)
Number of countries 105 98 106 109 76 68
R2 0.347 0.411 0.504 0.203 0.552 0.354
Notes. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown.
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5. Conclusions
The main finding is that government effectiveness is of central importance for electricity transitions
in developing countries. The result holds for the level of electricity, and also for the impact of past
government effectiveness on subsequent changes in electricity for the period 1996–2012. This paper
uses a large sample of developing countries, combines numerous data sources, assesses multiple
dimensions of electricity transitions, and controls for a wide range of important factors for explaining
electricity variables. We use data for up to 135 developing countries up to 2012.
This paper adds to the evidence that institutions are important for economic growth [9,10]
and development. In particular, it shows that government effectiveness is important for electricity
transitions in developing countries. Improving government effectiveness could be a vital step towards
meeting UN Sustainable Development Goal 7 of ensuring access to modern energy for all. Our finding
provides an example of the wide-ranging impact of institutions, complementing other examples such
as the finding of Collignon et al. [55] that poor governance contributes to the adverse public health
outcome of antibiotic resistance.
Government effectiveness appears to be the key aspect of governance for electricity transitions in
developing countries on average. Effective governments could impact on electricity outcomes through
a number of channels, with quality of regulation being one possible channel. Whilst other studies have
found that political instability has been a major negative factor in particular countries or small groups
of countries [56,57], this paper finds that government effectiveness is crucial on average across a large
sample of developing countries. The average effects estimated in this paper act as a complement to
research on the key institutional barriers to electricity transitions in individual developing countries.
The importance of government effectiveness for electricity transitions may relate to the need for
fundamental skills such as planning, committing, and prioritizing, while adapting to fit the specific
context in each country. For instance, the electrification experience of Sub-Saharan African countries
shows that ‘there is no single solution that fits all cases and each country would have to identify its own
solution’ [23] (p. 153). Governments need to be effective to identify and then be able to successfully
implement electrification plans. Sound regulatory quality in a country is not sufficient for electricity
transitions, as governments play a more central role in electrification than just setting the rules for the
private sector.
There are multiple quantifiable dimensions in electricity transitions, but results are similar for
each dimension. For instance, electricity transitions can be assessed on criteria of access, quantity
of consumption, capacity, transmission and distribution losses, or quality. Aspects of government
effectiveness are important for each of these electricity dimensions. This suggests that policy to
improve government effectiveness could have indirect benefits for many aspects of electricity.
Additional factors are also important for electricity transitions including economic and geographic
factors, and these impacts match expectation. For instance, this paper finds that higher GDP per capita
is associated with higher use of electricity. Higher temperatures are associated with lower electricity
use; temperature could be relevant for electricity use due to direct reasons such as differing motivations
for heating and cooling in countries with different temperatures, or other indirect reasons such as
impacts on sectoral compositions of economies. We also find that a higher rural share of the population
leads to lower electricity access.
Government effectiveness is an indirect channel promoting electricity transitions in developing
countries. Policies to enhance government effectiveness can provide a solid foundation and be
complementary to sector-specific policies to increase electricity access and use in developing countries.
Donors considering contributing to electrification in developing countries could expect more effective
outcomes by focusing on countries with better governance. Kenya, for example, had a government
effectiveness score above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012, and started to receive support
from the African Development Bank in 2015 for the Last Mile Connectivity Project. This project aims
to support government initiatives to increase electricity access [58]. Additional government input in
Kenya could help to convert investment in electricity grid infrastructure into higher rates of electricity
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access [59]. Ethiopia is another country that had a government effectiveness score above the average
for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012. In addition, Ethiopia has relatively high renewable energy potential,
particularly hydropower [60]. In contrast, countries with low government effectiveness could be more
risky destinations for donor contributions to electrification.
There is scope for further research on factors affecting electrification. For instance, the impacts of
economic structure and policies aiming to influence the industrial or services shares of GDP could be
investigated. In addition, the impact of electrification on long-term economic, social, and environmental
indicators is a related area for further research.
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Appendix A
Variable Source Description
Electricity capacity per capita (log) UN Log of electricity capacity per capita in kilowatts.
Electricity—household
consumption per capita (log) UN
Log of household consumption of electricity per capita in
megawatt-hours per year.
Electricity—final consumption per
capita (log) UN
Log of final consumption of electricity per capita in megawatt-hours
per year.
Access to electricity WDI Access to electricity (percentage of population divided by 100).
Electricity transmission and
distribution losses WDI
Electricity transmission and distribution losses (percentage of output
divided by 100).
Electricity quality index WEF Quality of electricity supply (lack of interruptions and lack of voltagefluctuations), 1 = extremely unreliable, 7 = extremely reliable.
Government effectiveness WGI
An index representing quality of public services and quality of policy
formulation and implementation. This and other governance index
values are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
of one.
Voice and accountability WGI An index representing the degree of citizen participation in governmentselection and freedom of expression.
Political stability WGI An index relating to the lack of violence in addition to stabilitymore generally.
Regulatory quality WGI An index giving an assessment of policies and regulations related toprivate sector development.
Rule of law WGI An index based on the quality of property rights and thejudicial system.
Control of corruption WGI An index representing the extent to which public power being used forprivate gain is avoided.
Gross domestic product per capita
(log) WDI
Log of GDP per capita per year, purchasing power parity terms,
constant 2011 international dollars.
Population WDI Number of people.
Rural population WDI Percentage of population living in rural areas.
Population density WDI People per square kilometer of land area, divided by one thousand.
Temperature CRU Average temperature, degrees Celsius.
Water resources per capita WDI Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (thousandcubic meters).
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Variable Source Description
Electricity prices WB
Average of electricity price from 2015 and 2016 data in US cents per
kilowatt-hour for a business with a standardized warehouse.
Earlier years of data are not available.
Democracy/autocracy PIV Democracy score minus autocracy score (Polity2 variable).
Africa/Middle East WDI Binary variable equal to 1 for countries in Africa and the Middle East.
Log life expectancy (1950–1955) UN Log life expectancy at birth, both sexes combined 1950–1955,medium variant.
Policy reform indicator ESM
Reform indicator for the power sector for reforms undertaken up to
1998. Countries have a score of between 0 and 6, with one point added
for each reform undertaken in the power sector from the following list:
utility commercialization/corporatization, energy law passed,
regulatory body commenced work, private sector investment in new
power plants, restructure/separation of state-owned power utility,
privatization of electricity generation or distribution.
GDP per capita, 1960 (log) CLIO Log of GDP per capita per year in 1990 international Geary-Khamisdollars, data for 1960.
Notes. Sources: UN: United Nations, WDI: World Development Indicators, WEF: World Economic Forum:
Competitiveness Rankings, WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators, WB: World Bank Doing Business—Getting
Electricity, CRU: Climate Research Unit (UK). PIV: Polity IV project, ESM: ESMAP [48], CLIO: Clio Infra—secretarial
function for database performed by International Institute of Social History and using a subsidy from the
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research.
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